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A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic,
purely oﬃce-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equi-
librium. In this short note, I show that this strong connection between the oﬃce
motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on
the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-
dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented
by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-
party model in which parties oﬀer substantially diﬀerent platforms in equilibrium even
though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters’ prefer-
ences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and
parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.
Keywords: Downs model, Games with Incomplete Preferences, Platform Diver-
gence, Knightian Uncertainty, Uncertainty Aversion. JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers:
C79, D72, D81.
1 Introduction
Two parties never run on the exact same platform in an electoral campaign. This stands in
sharp contrast to the predictions of models of two-party electoral competition in the tradition
of Downs (1957) and Hotelling (1929). One of the equilibrium predictions of these models is
that both parties announce the same platform. This equilibrium convergence is often seen
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1as a result of the assumptions that voters have single peaked preferences and that parties
are uniquely oﬃce-motivated, can freely choose and fully commit to their platforms.
In this article I provide an example of political competition a la Downs-Hotelling in
which equilibrium platforms may diverge even if the aforementioned tenets hold true. The
following two assumptions of the Downs-Hotelling model are relaxed here: Issue spaces
are uni-dimensional and parties act as unitary actors with a single belief on the voters’
preferences. Let me discuss each of these assumptions in turn:
There is wide agreement that the assumption that political issue spaces are uni-dimensional
is counterfactual. The main merit of this assumption is that it simpliﬁes the analysis of politi-
cal competition. However, the predictions of the Downs-Hotelling model change dramatically
when one replaces the assumption of a single dimensional issue space with that of a multi-
dimensional one: in the ﬁrst case, an equilibrium always exists; in that equilibrium, both
parties announce the median voter’s preferred platform. In the alternative case, an equilib-
rium only exists under very stringent assumptions on the distribution of voter preferences.
So the simpliﬁcation associated with the assumption of a uni-dimensional issue space can
hardly be viewed as benign.
Just as in the classic Downs-Hotelling model, I assume that the goal of the parties is to
maximize their respective vote shares. However, the parties in my model do not hold a single
belief on the distribution of voter preferences. Instead, they are assumed to hold multiple
beliefs. They calculate their vote share according to each one of these beliefs and only change
their platform if such a change looks favorable according to each of these calculations.
The ﬁrst story to justify these assumptions on the preferences and behavior of parties
goes as follows: say there is a group of party leaders. These leaders all share the goal of
winning as many votes as possible, but do have diﬀerent beliefs on the electorate. In addition,
a party’s platform will only be changed if the entire leadership unanimously agrees on such
a change. A second story motivates the same model of decision making as one of subjective
uncertainty. It holds that parties might not know enough about all voters’ preferences over
all policies to assign objective probabilities to their odds of obtaining votes for all possible
constellations of platforms. The decision-theoretic model of the present paper arises if we
assume that in the face of such subjective uncertainty parties do not act as expected utility
maximizers, but follow in Bewley’s model of Knightian uncertainty.
Let me now explain why party platforms might diverge in the equilibrium of a modiﬁed
Downs-Hotelling model. Consider a proﬁle of two diﬀerent platforms x and y and a voter
V who prefers platform x to platform y . Would V also prefer the intermediate platform
λx + (1 − λy) (for λ ∈ (0,1)) to the platform y? If the issue space is uni-dimensional, the
assumption that V ’s preferences are single-peaked implies their convexity. In that case, the
V must exhibit the named preference. Consequently, either party can only gain by moving
2its platform closer to that of the other party if the issue space is uni-dimensional. However,
if the issue space is multi-dimensional, single-peaked preferences need not be convex. So,
with a multidimensional issue space, V might well prefer platform y to some intermediate
platform λx+(1−λy). In that case, a party might lose votes by moving its platform closer
to that of the opponent. Moving closer is not necessarily a better response in the modiﬁed
Downs-Hotelling model.
This argument of non-convexities of single-peaked preferences over multidimensional is-
sue spaces does not suﬃce to obtain divergent equilibria. To see this, observe that, in each
equilibrium of a game of electoral competition a la Downs-Hotelling with a known distribu-
tion of voter preferences, the two parties must obtain exactly half the vote share. If not, the
party with the lower vote share has an incentive to adopt the platform of its opponent.
The multiple-beliefs model breaks this feature of political competition a la Downs-
Hotelling: in that model, a change of platform is only preferred if it increases the party’s vote
share according to all its beliefs on the electorate. If a platform proﬁle is associated with a
vote share below one half for party one according to some belief, the adoption of the other
parties’ platform increases party one’s vote share according to that belief. This alone does
not imply that party one prefers to run on the opponent’s platform. For that, the adoption
of the opponent’s platform would have to increase party one’s vote share according to all of
party one’s beliefs on the distribution of voter preferences. If party one holds some belief
according to which its vote share is higher than one half for the current proﬁle of platforms,
party one does not prefer to oﬀer the platform of the opponent. In a nutshell, the standard
model diﬀers from the multiple-beliefs model in the number of tests a deviation has to pass
to be considered preferred.
Since violations of convexity play a major role in my arguments, let me argue now that
the assumption of convexity does not appear to be intuitive for preferences over a multidi-
mensional issue space. Take the example of a mayor who could try to lure the European
soccer cup and/or the Olympic games to his city. Consider the following three proﬁles of
money spent towards the candidacy for the two events: (10,0),(0,10), and (5,5). Consider
an inhabitant of the city under question who is indiﬀerent between the ﬁrst two platforms.
Convexity would demand that this citizen would prefer the third platform to the other two.
While this might hold for some citizens, I surmise that the opposite preference is equally
plausible. To see this, let’s assume that the citizen under consideration would like to have
a big event in his home town and believes that any campaign for such an event must spend
at least 7 to have a positive chance to succeed. Clearly this citizen should strictly prefer the
“extreme” platforms (10,0) and (0,10) to the intermediate platform (5,5).
This is an example with a natural unit of measurement: euros. However, in many other
typical problems in political economy, the use of cardinal rankings is questionable. It might,
3for example, be possible to order foreign policy on a scale from dovish to hawkish and
abortion politics on a scale from liberal to conservative. In either case, such statements as
“twice as hawkish”, “half as liberal” seem to be devoid of any meaning. But the deﬁnition of
convex preferences presupposes that these statements are ﬁlled with meaning. If we remain
agnostic on the measurement units of the axes of the political issue space, we should only use
conditions that are robust to a rescaling of the axes. Without cardinal measures of politics,
we can, in particular, not impose that the voters’ preferences should be convex.
Of course, this is not the ﬁrst model of electoral competition that explains the divergence
of party platforms. However, as far as I am aware, the emergence of diﬀerent platforms is
usually owed to the assumption of some exogenous ideological allegiance of parties and/or
politicians. This deﬁnitely holds for the models by Wittman (1973), Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), Besely and Coate (1997), and Roemer (1999). Another set of models goes a diﬀerent
route by prefacing Downsian competition among two parties by a stage in which these two
competitors are selected (or threatened by the entry of a third). Palfrey (1984) and more
recently Brusco, Dziubinski, and Roy (2010) fall into that group.
2 Electoral Competition
I model political competition as a two-stage game played by two diﬀerent types of actors, two
political parties, and a large set of voters. First, the two parties simultaneously choose their
platforms within some (non-empty) convex issue space X ⊂ Rn, n ≥ 1. I denote generic
elements of X by x = (x1,x2,··· ,xn). Proﬁles of platforms are denoted by hx,yi. Then,
the voters, whose preferences are deﬁned over that same issue space X, cast their votes. I
assume throughout that parties credibly commit to their platforms, and that voters only
care about platforms. In particular, no voter has any ideological attachment or bias towards
either party. So there are no a priori diﬀerences between the two parties. Any diﬀerences
between their equilibrium positions arise endogenously.
2.1 Voters
I assume that all voter preferences are single-peaked, in the sense that each voter has some
most preferred policy in the issue space and that his utility decreases as platforms move
further and further away from this ideal point. Formally, some preferences % are considered
single-peaked if there exists an ideal point a ∈ X, such that for any two platforms x and
y in X with (ai−xi)(ai−yi) ≥ 0, | ai−xi |≤| ai−yi | for all issues i and | ai0−xi0 |<| ai0−yi0 |













Figure 1: The Condition of single-peakedness
deﬁnition of single-peakedness.1
To understand this deﬁnition, consider the platforms a,x,y,w, and z in the two-dimensional
issue space illustrated in Figure 1. The criterion of single-peakedness imposes that a voter
with the ideal point a prefers platforms x and z to platform y. These three platforms lie
northeast of a, so (ai − xi)(ai − yi) ≥ 0, (ai − xi)(ai − zi) ≥ 0 and (ai − zi)(ai − yi) ≥ 0
for i = 1,2, the necessary condition for single-peakedness to rank these platforms holds.
Moreover, the two arrows indicate that y is more distant from a than x with respect to both
axes. The same holds for the relation between z and y. Conversely, z and x are not ranked
by the criterion, as | a1−x1 |>| a1−z1 |, whereas | a2−x2 |<| a2−z2 |. Finally, the criterion
does not rank w with respect to any of the other three platforms, since (a1−w1)(a1−t1) < 0
for t = x,y,z.
Note that the platforms x and z both lie in the rectangle with a and y as its south-west
1If we impose that the issue space is uni-dimensional (n = 1), then the present deﬁnition reduces to the
standard deﬁnition of single peakedness. Any voter’s ideal point is unique and no voter prefers any platform
to his ideal point.
5and north-east corners, hatched in pink in Figure 1. In fact, the criterion of single-peakedness
ranks two platforms x and y if and only if one of the two lies in the rectangle spanned by
the other and the agent’s ideal point a. To formalize this statement, I deﬁne the area in
between two platforms x and y as
bx,ye := {z ∈ X \ {x,y} | min(xi,yi) ≤ zi ≤ max(xi,yi)}
and say that some platform z lies in between the two platforms x and y if z ∈ bx,ye.
Now the requirement of single-peakedness can be reformulated as follows: preferences are
single-peaked if there exists an (ideal point) a such that x ∈ ba,ye implies that x ￿ y for all
x,y ∈ X. To see that the criterion of single-peakedness does not rank x with respect to z or
w in the example given by Figure 1, observe that w,z / ∈ ba,xe, the area hatched in green,
holds as well as x / ∈ ba,we and x / ∈ ba,ze. Similar arguments can be made to show that
single peakendess does not impose any ranking between w and the other platforms singled
out in this ﬁgure.
Figure 2.1 takes up the same platforms x, y, w, and z and provides two examples of
indiﬀerence curves corresponding to diﬀerent single-peaked preferences with ideal point a.
As a ﬁrst example, consider Euclidean preferences in which each voter measures the disutiliy
of a platform x as the Euclidean distance between his ideal point a ∈ X and that platform x.
Such preferences over a two-dimensional issue space X are represented through the function
va : X → R with va(x) = −(x1−a1)2−(x2−a2)2, where a is the ideal point of the preferences.
The black circle in Figure 2 represents an indiﬀerence curve of an agent with ideal point a
and Euclidean preferences. Such an agent prefers w to x, which he, in turn, prefers to z.
Next, consider the example of preferences over a two-dimensional issue space X that can
be represented by a function ua : X → R with ua(x) = −
p
|x1 − a1| −
p
|x2 − a2|. The
green line represents an indiﬀerence curve corresponding to this kind of preferences. Note
that these preferences are not convex, the agent is indiﬀerent between platforms s and t and
strictly prefers each of these to the intermediate platform 1
2t+ 1
2s. To see that the convexity
of preferences depends on the scaling of the axes, consider a voter whose preferences are
represented by u(0,0). Rescale both axes with the strictly monotonic function t 7→ t4. In the
rescaled issue space, the same preferences are represented by v(0,0).
In terms of voter behavior, I assume that any voter who strictly prefers the platform of
one party to that of the other votes for his strictly preferred platform. Any indiﬀerent voter
votes for each party with equal probability.
2.2 Electorates
Formally an electorate is identiﬁed with some distribution ψ on the set of single-peaked





















Figure 2: Examples of Single-peaked Preferences
7electorate ψ satisﬁes some property Θ is denoted by ψ({% : % satisﬁes Θ}). To
avoid formal complications, I only consider distributions ψ with ﬁnite support. Bearing the
assumption over voter behavior in mind, the expected vote share of party one at platform
proﬁle hx,yi and electorate ψ can be calculated as: πψ(hx,yi): = ψ({%: x ￿ y})+ 1
2ψ({%:
x ∼ y}). Party two’s vote share is 1 − πψ(hx,yi) = πψ(hy,xi)
Observe that πψ was deﬁned with respect to a known distribution of voter preferences.
In general this distribution will not be known, decision makers will have to form some ex-
pectation on the distribution of voter preferences. In this context, it is important to note
that the expected vote share E(πψ(hx,yi)) for some distribution over the set of possible
electorates equals the vote share according to the expected electorate πE(ψ)(hx,yi), where I
assume that the expectation is taken over some distribution p over distributions of voter pref-
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j=1pjψj({%: x ∼ y})) = E(ψ)({%: x ￿ y})+ 1
2E(ψ)({%: x ∼ y})) where E(ψ) is
a distribution of voter ideal points that attributes probability
Pm
j=1pjψj(%) to any prefer-
ences %. Given that the support of p and of each ψj is ﬁnite, the support of E(ψ) is ﬁnite.
Moreover, since ψj(%) is only positive for single-peaked preferences, E(ψ)(%) = 0 for all %
that are not single-peaked.2
2.3 Parties
I assume that the goal of each party is to maximize its vote share. A party’s strategy
variable is its platform, and hence the issue space X is its strategy space. If the electorate
were known to be ψ, the objective of party one would simply be to maximize πψ(hx,yi).
By the arguments in the preceding section, the same formula would apply to the case that
parties are expected vote-share maximizers; in that case, ψ would have to be interpreted as
the expected electorate.
However, the parties in the present model are assumed to follow a model of decision
making that deviates from expected utility maximization. They are assumed to take a set of
diﬀerent distributions Ψ into account when deciding where to locate their platforms in the
issue space. I assume that parties one and two have incomplete preferences represented by
hx,yi 7→ (πψ(hx,yi))ψ∈Ψ and hx,yi 7→ (1 − πψ(hy,xi))ψ∈Ψ = (πψ(hx,yi))ψ∈Ψ (1)
for some set of priors Ψ, where (πψ(hx,yi))ψ∈Ψ denotes the vector of vote shares πψ(hx,yi)
for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Party one prefers some platform proﬁle hx,yi to another platform proﬁle
2In Bade (2010), I provide the technically more complex proof that the equality E(πψ(hx,yi)) =
πE(ψ)(hx,yi) holds for non-atomic distributions.
8hx’,y’i if and only if party one’s vote share under hx,yi is not lower than its vote share
under hx’,y’i for any electorate ψ in Ψ. This preference is strict if, in addition, there exists
some electorate ψ0 ∈ Ψ such that πψ0(hx,yi) > πψ0(hx0,y0i). Party one is indiﬀerent between
the two proﬁles if and only if πψ(hx,yi) = πψ(hx0,y0i) holds for all ψ ∈ Ψ. In all other cases,
party one cannot rank the two platform proﬁles. The standard case of vote-share-maximizing
parties obtains upon assuming that Ψ is a singleton (Ψ = {ψ}).
Given that preferences are incomplete, party behavior is not (fully) determined by pref-
erences. I assume that parties only change their platform if this leads to a strictly preferred
outcome. If party one cannot rank proﬁle hx,yi and hx0,yi, then that party would not devi-
ate from x to x0 given that party two’s platform is y . The larger the set of party beliefs Ψ,
the more incomplete the preferences and the more important is the behavioral assumption.
2.4 Stories
Let me tell three diﬀerent stories to justify such a model of party preferences and behavior:
According to the ﬁrst story, parties are subjectively uncertain about the electorate, where
their preferences can be represented following Bewley’s Model of Knightian uncertainty (Be-
wley, 2002). In justiﬁcation of the assumption of subjective uncertainty, observe that real
parties do indeed face choices with uncertain consequences. Electoral outcomes are gener-
ally hard to predict as elections are usually held in ever-changing environments involving
new issues, turnover of party elites, and an evolving composition of the electorate. Taking
the 2008 US presidential election as an example, observe that neither the experience with
past elections nor any amount of polling would have been suﬃcient to determine objective
winning probabilities for Barack Obama and John McCain for all possible combinations of
platforms, given that they where dealing with some new issues (how to respond to bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers?), a new party elite (Barack Obama was the ﬁrst African American to
be nominated for President by a major political party), and a large share of ﬁrst-time voters.
It is well documented that individuals violate expected utility maximization in the face
of such subjective uncertainty. A large range of experimental studies demonstrates a bias
against uncertainty (cf. Camerer and Weber (1992)). These experimental results have
spurred a large literature on the representation of uncertainty-averse preferences.
Bewley’s (2002) multiple prior model stands out as one of the path-breaking represen-
tations in that literature.3 According to his model, agents calculate expected utilities for a
set of priors Ψ on the subjectively uncertain environment. An agent prefers some action f
over some other action g if f yields a higher expected utility according to all priors ψ ∈ Ψ.
3Other approaches towards modeling uncertainly aversion have been proposed by Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989), Schmeidler (1989), Klibnoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and Cerreira-Vioglio, Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2009).
9The resulting preferences are incomplete: if for both actions f and g there exist priors ψf
and ψg in Ψ such that f is associated with strictly higher expected utility than g according
to the prior ψf and the inverse holds true when according to ψg, the agent cannot rank f
and g. To determine behavior in the face of incompleteness, Bewley’s framework contains an
inertia assumption which corresponds precisely to the assumption made here.4 In terms of
individual behavior, the inertia assumption can be justiﬁed following Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1982), who argue that people tend to regret losses resulting from actions more than
losses resulting from inaction. Analogously to their stock market example, we could expect
that party members would feel more upset about losing an election as a result of switching
their platform than losing an election by keeping their platform.
For the second story on party preferences, observe that parties generally consist of many
members or factions with diﬀerent interests or beliefs. To decide on a platform, the various
party leaders have to come to some form of compromise or agreement. We could assume that
all these leaders share a common goal: they all hope to maximize their party’s vote share.
However, the leaders might have diﬀerent expectations on the preferences of the electorate.
The preferences posited here obtain if some platform proﬁle hx,yi is preferred to another
proﬁle hx0,y0i if it yields a higher vote share to party one according to the beliefs of all
party leaders. John Roemer (1999, 2001) and Gilat Levy (2004) tell similar stories of parties
as non-unitary actors. Both posit that a party prefers platform proﬁle hx,yi over another
proﬁle hx0,y0i if it is preferred from the vantage point of every faction or member of that
party. The main diﬀerence between their stories and the story told here is that diﬀerent
leaders are set apart by diﬀerent beliefs in the present model, whereas they are set apart by
diﬀerent goals in their models.
In terms of this story, the inertia assumption can be derived from a party decision process
that requires unanimity for deviations. To change any of party’s platform, the leaders all
have to agree. If no compromise can be reached, the status quo always remains as a fallback
option. John Roemer (1999, 2001) and Gilat Levy (2004) rely on precisely this argument
to introduce a status quo bias into their respective models of platform positioning. In both
cases, parties consist of many factions or members and they move from one platform to
another only if this move is considered worthwhile by all the factions or party members. In
other words: every party faction or member has veto power against any change of a party’s
position.
The same type of preferences could be derived from the following set of entirely diﬀerent
4There is one diﬀerence between the model proposed here and Bewley’s: I did not specify any particular
sets of beliefs Ψ. In contrast, the representation by Bewley demands closed and convex sets of beliefs. The
centerpiece of the article consists in an example with a ﬁnite set of beliefs Ψ. However, this example can
easily be amended to ﬁt Bewley’s framework, by replacing the set of beliefs in that example with the convex
hull of this set. The equilibrium set of the example does not change.
10assumptions. Remaining fully within the framework of standard Downs-Hotelling models, we
could assume that parties know everything about the preferences of voters. Deviating from
that standard setup, we would have to posit that the preferences of voters are incomplete.
So we would have to assume that voters would not be able to rank all platforms. Finally, we
could assume that a party prefers platform proﬁle hx,yi to platform proﬁle hx0,y0i if the ﬁrst
platform proﬁle yields the party a higher vote share according to all possible theories on the
choices made by indecisive voters. If we assume, in addition, that parties would only change
their platform in the case of such strict preference, we could obtain the same formulation
of a party’s preferences without ever referring to their uncertainty about the preferences of
voters.
Some further justiﬁcation of the inertia assumption lies in the political value of stability
and applies to all three stories: the image of a party being true to itself carries a positive
connotation, whereas a party that is ﬁckle, that goes with every trend, can be seen as
a turncoat, deﬁnitely a negative association. The model presented here is a static one;
consequently, such dynamic considerations cannot play any role within the model. However,
within a more general model that would analyze elections within a dynamic framework,
long-run considerations might bias a party in favor of their status quo platform. An explicit
introduction of credibility concerns could provide a foundation of inertia. The credibility of a
commitment to any particular platform could, in a dynamic model, be modeled as dependent
upon the continuity with which the party has been advocating that same platform.
2.5 The Game of Platform Positioning
A two-player game of electoral competition is then characterized by the triplet (n,X,Ψ),
where n is the dimension of the issue space X and Ψ is the set of party beliefs. This is a
normal-form game with the two parties as the players, the issue space X as the strategy
space of either player, and where the payoﬀ functions of parties one and two are deﬁned in
expression (1). I assume here that both parties subscribe to the same set of priors Ψ on
the electorate. On the one hand, this keeps notation at a minimum. On the other hand,
this strengthens the argument that divergence arises purely endogenously; no exogenous
diﬀerences between parties are assumed. The results can easily be modiﬁed to comprise
games in which parties hold diﬀerent sets of priors about the electorate. Standard Downsian
games are embedded in the present framework, they constitute the set of games, with uni-
dimensional issue spaces and singleton priors: (1,X,{ψ}).




(πψ(hz,yi))ψ∈Ψ and y ∈ argmax
z∈X
(1 − πψ(hx,zi))ψ∈Ψ .
11Note that the platform proﬁle hx,yi is not an equilibrium if there exists a platform x0
such that hx0,yi leads to a higher expected vote share for party one for every ψ ∈ Ψ as
x ∈ argmax
z∈X
(πψ(hz,yi)) would then be violated. The deﬁnition of equilibrium reﬂects the
notion of inertia, insofar as any maximizer of (πψ(hz,yi))ψ∈Ψ is considered a best reply to
y.5
2.6 Divergence
To present an example of electoral competition with a divergent equilibrium, some notion
of “divergence” is needed. As a ﬁrst pass, one might consider any equilibrium hx,yi with
x 6= y as divergent. To see that this deﬁnition is not stringent enough, recall that even
classical Downsian games (1,X,{ψ}) can have such equilibria: any proﬁle of platforms hx,yi
with both x and y medians of the distribution of voter ideal points is an equilibrium in such
a game. To rule out such cases, an equilibrium hx,yi is only called divergent if “some voters’
ideal points lie in between the platforms x and y”. In the framework of the classical Downsian
model, this requirement is easily formalized as hx,yi is divergent if and only if ψ({%: a(%) ∈
(min(x,y),max(x,y))}) > 0. According to this deﬁnition, the classical Downsian model has
no divergent equilibria. In terms of the general model, the same requirement is formalized
as
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium hx,yi is called divergent if ψ({%: a(%) ∈ bx,ye}) > 0
for all ψ ∈ Ψ.
Here “in between” is interpreted following the deﬁnition of the area in between two plat-
forms given in Section 2.1. The statement “Θ holds for some voters” is formally translated
to “according to any ψ ∈ Ψ, Θ holds for a set of voters that has positive probability mass”.
In sum, a platform proﬁle hx,yi is considered divergent if the probability that the ideal point
of a randomly drawn voter lies in between x and y is positive according every belief ψ ∈ Ψ.
The notion of divergence plays a crucial role in the two main results of the article:
Theorem 1 shows that divergent equilibria may exist in the present model of Downsian
competition, while Theorem 2 shows that the multi-dimensionality of the political issue
space is a necessary condition for divergent equilibria to exist. One could obtain a stronger
version of Theorem 1 if one was to use a more restrictive notion of divergence,; the opposite
holds true for Theorem 2. I therefore now consider a strengthening and a weakening of the
notion of divergence.
A more restrictive notion of divergence could be based on a more restrictive interpretation
of some ideal point lying “in between” two platforms. To this end, one could deﬁne the set
5In Bade (2005), I provide a characterizationof equilibrium sets of such games with incomplete preferences.
12of all convex combinations of two platforms as the area in between these two platforms. I
opted against this deﬁnition since the set of platforms between two platforms is not robust
to rescaling the axes of the issue space X. The notion of “in between”, deﬁned above, is not
vulnerable to this criticism, the set bx,ye is robust to rescaling.6 Moreover, if one considers
non-atomic distributions of voter ideal points, there are no proﬁles of divergent platforms
since the set of convex combinations of two platforms has measure zero. Still, once I prove
Theorem 1, I go on to show that the result also holds when using this much stronger notion
of divergence. This is important since any reasonable weaker notion of divergence would
probably also demand that any convex combination of the platforms is considered to be lying
in between these two platforms. Conversely, the notion of divergence could be weakened if
one was to interpret “Θ holds for some voters” as “according to some ψ ∈ Ψ, Θ holds for
a set of voters that has positive probability mass”. If one requires absolute continuity of
the set Ψ, the two notions of divergence coincide. Theorem 2 can be amended to a stronger
version, by using the less restrictive notion of divergence.
3 The Existence of Divergent Equilibrium
In this section, I state and prove the claim that multidimensional games with uncertainty
averse parties can have divergent equilibria.
Theorem 1: A game of electoral competition (n,X,Ψ) can have divergent equilibria.
Proof: Take the game (2,[0,1]2,Ψ) with Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2} deﬁned by
ψ
1({%: a(%) = (0,0)}) = ψ





1({%: a(%) = (1,1)}) = ψ





1({%: a(%) = (1,0)}) = ψ





1({%: a(%) = (0,1)}) = ψ








i({%: a(%) = (.5,.5)}) = =
2
27
for i = 1,2.
Let the preferences of voters with ideal points (1,0) and (0,1) be represented by non-convex
utility functions ua, as deﬁned in Section 2.1. All other voters have Euclidean preferences.
The electorate is illustrated in Figure 3. All indiﬀerence curves are drawn in green. The
6Note that the set bx,ye only involves notions of “more” or “less” and is therefore unaﬀected by any























Figure 3: The Electorate
fractions right next to the ideal points denote the probability mass of voters at the respective
ideal points, where the label 1
6 + [ 4
27]2 of point (0,1) is to be read as follows: under either
distribution, at least
1
6 of the electorate is expected to have their idea point at (0,1); under
distribution ψ2, the probability mass at (0,1) increases to 1
6 + 4
27.
Note that parties are unsure about
10
27 of the electorate: these voters might have their
ideal points at (0,1), (1,0), (0,0) and (1,1). For the remaining 17
27, the two distributions ψ1
and ψ2 agree. In particular, both distributions assign a probability of
2
27 to the event that
a randomly drawn voter has his ideal point at (.5,.5). All voters with ideal points at (0,1)
and (1,0) and (.5,.5) are indiﬀerent between the “extreme policies” (0,0) and (1,1). The
preferences of voters with their ideal point at (0,1) and (1,0) are not convex; these voters
prefer platforms (0,0) and (1,1) to any of the intermediate policies (x,x) for any x ∈ (0,1).
14The set of platforms in [0,1]2 which voters with their ideal point at (0,1) prefer to platform
(1,1) is hatched in red.
I claim that h(0,0);(1,1)i is a divergent equilibrium of this game.
I start by showing that party one’s platform (0,0) is a best response to (1,1), the second















2. Since there is a prior, namely ψ1, such
that party one gets more than half the vote according to the proﬁle under consideration, it
is not a best reply for party one to oﬀer party two’s platform.
Next, observe that for any x / ∈ {(0,0),(1,1)}, either voters with their ideal point at (0,1)
or the voters with their ideal point at (1,0) (or both) strictly prefer platform (1,1) to x.
Graphically this claim corresponds to the observation that the upper-contour sets of (1,1)
of voters with their ideal point at (0,1) and (1,0) do not intersect.
To prove this claim formally suppose there was a platform x that would win the favor of
the voters with ideal point at (1,0) [or (0,1)] while keeping voters with the ideal point (1,0)
[or (0,1)] at least indiﬀerent. For such a platform x, we would have to have that:
−
p
|x1 − 1| −
p
|x2 − 0| ≥ −
p
|1 − 1| −
p
|1 − 0| and
−
p
|x1 − 0| −
p
|x2 − 1| ≥ −
p




|x1 − 1| + 2
p
|x1 − 1||x2| + |x2| ≤ 1 and
|x1| + 2
p
|x1||x2 − 1| + |x2 − 1| ≤ 1
with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly. Adding both constraints up and taking
into account that at least one is strict, we obtain:
2
p
|x1 − 1||x2| + 2
p
|x1||x2 − 1| < 2 − |x1 − 1| − |x1| − |x2| − |x2 − 1|
But 2 − |x1 − 1| − |x1| − |x2| − |x2 − 1| ≤ 0 for all x1 and x2.
By single-peakedness, voters with their ideal point at (0,0) strictly prefer x to (1,1),
and voters with their ideal point at (1,1) have the opposite preference. So, the question
is whether party one can gain the votes of all voters with ideal points at (1,0) and (.5,.5)
(or at (0,1) and (.5,.5)) instead of gaining half the votes of the voters at (0,1),(1,0) and




27 of the electorate have
their ideal points at (0,1),(1,0), and (.5,.5). However, according to ψ1, only 1
6 + 2
27 of the
electorate have their ideal points at (1,0),(.5,.5), so a deviation that only gains the favor
of these voters cannot be preferred. The existence of a preferred deviation that gains the
support of voters with ideal points (1,0),(.5,.5) is ruled out mutatis mutandis.
15We can conclude that (0,0) is indeed a best reply to (1,1). Since the example was
constructed fully symmetric it also holds that (1,1) is a best reply to (0,0), and conse-
quently h(0,0),(1,1)i is an equilibrium. Finally h(0,0),(1,1)i is divergent as as (.5,.5) ∈
b(0,0),(1,1)e and ψi({%: a(%) = (.5,.5)}) = 2
27 > 0 for both i = 1 and i = 2. ￿
Remarks:
(A) Following Section 2.6, an equilibrium hx,yi is called divergent if some voters have
their ideal points between the two platforms x and y. This notion of divergence relies on
the deﬁnition of the area in between x and y as bx,ye. Here, I would like to note that
the proof of Theorem 1 goes through when replacing the weaker notion of divergence by
the (much) stronger one which calls two platforms x and y divergent if ψ({%: a(%) =
λx + (1 − λ)y for some λ ∈ (0,1)}) holds for all ψ ∈ Ψ as ψi({%: a(%) = (x,x) with 0 <
x < 1}) = ψi({%: a(%) = (.5,.5)}) holds for i = 1,2.
(B) The only other equilibrium of the game is h(1,1),(0,0)i. The proof of this observation
is tedious and therefore relegated to the Appendix.
(C) Not all aspects of the speciﬁcation of Ψ were needed to prove that h(0,0),(1,1)i is
an equilibrium. In particular, I did not use the assumption that voters with ideal points
(0,0),(.5,.5), and (1,1) have Euclidean preferences. The proof goes through when only
assuming that their preferences are single-peaked. Given that the preferences of all voters in
the example are representable, separable and symmetric, the result also holds if we require
that all voters satisfy any combination of these properties, which are deﬁned as follows: Some
preferences % on X are representable if there exists a function u : X 7→ R such that x % y
holds if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y). Some representable preferences on X ⊂ Rn are considered
separable if there exist functions ui for i = 1,··· ,n such that u(x) =
Pn
i=1 ui(xi).7 Some
single-peaked preferences % with ideal point a are considered symmetric if x ∼ 2a − x for
x,2a − x ∈ X. In addition, there is some leeway as to the distribution of probability mass
across the diﬀerent voter types.
(D) The proﬁle h(0,0),(1,1)i is an equilibrium of any game (2,[0,1]2,Ψ0) with Ψ ∈ Ψ0.
To see this, observe that, for (0,0) to be a best response to (1,1), it only needs to hold
that for any deviation x 6= (0,0) there exists some belief ψ ∈ Ψ such that πψ(hx,(1,1)i) <
πψ(h(0,0),(1,1)i). Since this inequality holds either for ψ1 or ψ2, as was shown in the proof
of Theorem 1, and since ψi ∈ Ψ ⊂ Ψ0 for i = 1,2, there cannot be any better response
7Separability can also be deﬁned without the assumption of representability. Since that more general def-
inition is tedious to state and since separability without representability is not important to the development
of the arguments here, I chose to stick with the simpler case.
16x to (1,1) for the larger set of beliefs Ψ0. To say it more generally: making preferences
of players more incomplete can only increase the equilibrium set of a game. Games might
have convergent and divergent equilibria. To see this, consider the game (2,[0,1]2,Ψ00) with
Ψ00 = {ψ1,ψ2,ψ3} and ψ3({%: a(%) = (.5,.5)}) = 1, so according to ψ3 the parties are sure
that all voters have their ideal point at (.5,.5). Note that h(.5,.5),(.5,.5)i is an equilibrium
of the game, for any deviation from this proﬁle the deviating party would leave the entire
electorate to the other party according to ψ3. By the preceding argument h(0,0),(1,1)i is
also an equilibrium of (2,[0,1]2,Ψ00).
(E) In this article, I assume that parties maximize their respective vote shares. Let
me now investigate how Theorem 1 would change if one was to follow the equally popular
assumption that parties maximize their probability of winning the election. Formally, party




2 and w(x) = 1 for x < 1
2. Party two’s objective function is 1 − w(πψ(hx,yi)). In
the classic Downs-Hotelling model, the two assumptions turn out to be equivalent, in the
sense that a proﬁle is an equilibrium for one of the two assumptions if and only if it is an
equilibrium for the other assumption. This does not hold for the present model:
If we change the present model to assume that (w(πψ(hx,yi)))ψ∈Ψ and (1−w(πψ(hx,yi)))ψ∈Ψ,
respectively, are party one and two’s objective functions, then h(0,0),(1,1)i is not an equi-
librium of (n,X,Ψ) as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 1. Party one’s payoﬀ vector for the
proﬁle h(0,0),(1,1)i would then be (1,0). For a deviation to (.1,0), party one would win the
election under both beliefs, so it would increase its payoﬀ vector to (1,1).
This does not mean that the assumption of parties that maximize their probability
of winning rules out the existence of divergent equilibria. Consider the game (n,X,Ψ∗)
where Ψ∗ = {ψ1∗,ψ2∗} and ψ1∗,ψ2∗ diﬀer from ψ1,ψ2 only insofar as that ψi({%: a(%) =
(0,0)}) = ψi({%: a(%) = (1,1)}) = 2
9 for both i = 1,2. It is easy, but tedious, to check
that h(0,0),(1,1)i is a (divergent) equilibrium of that game when assuming that parties aim
to maximize their probability of winning. Interestingly, h(0,0),(1,1)i is also an equilibrium
of that game when assuming parties that maximize their vote shares. In fact, h(0,0),(1,1)i
remains an equilibrium in any version of (n,X,Ψ∗) that assumes that parties aim to max-
imize some convex combination of their probability of winning and their vote share. This
last assumption is unquestionably the most realistic representation of party goals. I chose
to work with the assumption of vote-share-maximizing parties since it renders the analysis
signiﬁcantly less cumbersome and since the main insights of the model are not hampered by
this more simplistic assumption on party goals.
174 Necessary Conditions for Divergence
The model presented here deviates from the classical Downs-Hotelling model in two respects:
the issue space is multidimensional and parties hold multiple beliefs on the electorate. In
this section, I argue that both diﬀerences are essential to obtaining divergent equilibria.
Theorem 2: The multi-dimensionality of the issue space is a necessary condition for the
existence of divergent equilibria.
Proof: Suppose some game (n,X,Ψ) had a divergent equilibrium hx,yi even though
the preferences of all voters are convex (formally: ψ({%}) > 0 for some ψ ∈ Ψ implies
that % is convex). Observe that the party proposing x is at least as well oﬀ proposing
λx + (1 − λ)y for any λ ∈ (0,1). Consider a voter with preferences % who prefers x to y.
By the convexity assumption, he also prefers λx+(1−λ)y to y. So we have that the set of
voters preferring λx + (1 − λ)y to y is a superset of the set of voters preferring x to y and
therefore, πψ(hx,yi) ≤ πψ(hλx + (1 − λ)y,yi) for all ψ ∈ Ψ.
To show that there exists a strictly preferred deviation for the ﬁrst party, we need to
show that for at least one ψ∗ ∈ Ψ and some λ∗ ∈ (0,1) we have πψ∗(hx,yi) < πψ∗(hλ∗x +
(1 − λ∗)y,yi). By the supposition that hx,yi a divergent equilibrium we know that ψ({%:
a(%) ∈ bx,ye}) > 0 for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Assume w.l.o.g. that under platform proﬁle hx,yi some
voters in the area bx,ye are in favor of platform y , formally: ψ∗({%∗}) > 0 for some ψ∗ ∈ Ψ
where y ￿∗ x and a(%∗) ∈ bx,ye. Now observe that for some small enough λ∗ ∈ (0,1)
λ∗x + (1 − λ∗)y lies in between a(%∗) and y . This together with single peakedness implies
that π∗
ψ(hλ∗x+ (1−λ∗)y, yi) ≥ ψ∗({%∗})+π∗
ψ(hx,yi). Which in turn implies that party 1
is better oﬀ deviating to λ∗x + (1 − λ∗)y.
The multi-dimensionality of the issue space is a necessary condition for the existence of
divergent equilibria since single peaked preferences over a uni-dimensional issue space are
automatically convex. ￿
Remark: Just like Theorem 1 is strengthened by assuming a more restrictive notion of
divergence, Theorem 2 is strengthened by assuming a weaker one. Following the discussion
in Section 2.6, let me weaken the concept of divergence to require only that ψi({%: a(%) ∈
bx,ye}) holds for some ψ ∈ Ψ for hx,yi. The proof of Theorem 2 directly applies to the
stronger version of Theorem 2 which builds on the weakened notion of divergence: in fact, in
the proof, I only showed that the preferred deviation is strictly preferred according to some
prior ψ∗ ∈ Ψ.
I was not able to show that games in which parties base their decision on unique priors
(n,X,{ψ}) never have any divergent equilibria. What certainly holds, is that for such an
18equilibrium to exist, some very specialized conditions would have to hold true. To start
with, it has to hold true that ψ(hx,yi) = 1
2, since otherwise the party with the lower vote
share would be able to increase its vote share by oﬀering the platform of the opponent. Of
course, to be an equilibrium ψ(hx0,yi) ≤ 1
2 as well as ψ(hx,y0i) ≤ 1
2 would have to hold for
all platforms x0 and y0. This would, in turn, imply that hx,xi and hy,yi are also equilibria
of the game. It would certainly not be possible to draw much empirical relevance from
the example of a game (n,X,{ψ}) with a divergent equilibrium, as the conditions for the
existence are very tight. Thus, it can be concluded that a multiple-prior model is at least
necessary for divergence to be more than a knife-edge phenomenon. The question whether
the multiplicity is mathematically necessary for divergent equilibria remains open.
5 Prior Results and a Note on Equilibrium Existence
Games of the form (n,X,{ψ}),, that is games with known electorates or, equivalently, with
expected utility-maximizing parties, have been studied widely in the literature. For games
with uni-dimensional issue spaces Downs (1957) showed that equilibria always exist and that
in equilibrium both parties will announce the policy preferred by some median voter. No
game (1,X,{ψ}) has any divergent equilibria.
On the contrary, games of multidimensional political competition with expected utility
maximizing parties hardly ever have any equilibria. Davis, Hinich, and de Groot (1972),
Grandmont (1978), and Plott (1967) all provide negative results on the existence of equilibria
in games (n,X,{ψ}) with n ≥ 2. A study on the characterization of these equilibria of
multidimensional political games would therefore be quite meaningless: it would be a study
of objects that hardly ever exist. In any case, the results we have mostly predict that, if an
equilibrium exists, both parties should announce the same platform (see Davis, Hinich, and
de Groot (1972) and Grandmont (1978)).
The games under review in this study, that is, games of the form (n,X,Ψ), are not plagued
by the same non-existence problems as are games of multidimensional political competition
with utility-maximizing or certain parties. To see this, consider games (n,X,Ψ)∗ which diﬀer
from the games deﬁned in the present paper only insofar as party preferences over platform
proﬁles hx,yi are complete and can be represented by minψ∈Ψ πψ(hx,yi).8 In Bade (2010),
I described conditions on the set of party beliefs Ψ, under which games (n,X,Ψ)∗ have an
8In terms of the motivational story on parties as non-unitary actors, the assumption that parties only
change their position if it looks advantageous from the point of view of all factions would have to be replaced
by the assumption that any party changes its platform if it looks advantageous from the point of view of the
faction that foresees the lowest share for the party. In terms of the story of uncertainty aversion, Bewley’s
model of Knightian uncertainty would have to be replaced by Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin expected
utility representation.
19equilibrium.
Now observe that the parties in games (n,X,Ψ) are less prone to change their plat-
forms than the parties in games (n,X,Ψ)∗. In a game (n,X,Ψ)∗, party one would de-
viate from x0 to x if minψ∈Ψ πψ(hx0,yi) > minψ∈Ψ πψ(hx,yi). In contrast, in a game
(n,X,Ψ), party one would only deviate if the following decisively stronger condition held:
πψ(hx0,yi) ≥ πψ(hx,yi) for all ψ ∈ Ψ with πψ0(hx0,yi) > πψ0(hx,yi) for some ψ0 ∈ Ψ.
Therefore, the equilibrium set of any game (n,X,Ψ)∗ is always contained in the correspond-
ing game (n,X,Ψ). It holds, in particular, that (n,X,Ψ) has an equilibrium if (n,X,Ψ)∗
does. Consequently, the results on equilibrium existence in Bade (2010) can directly be
transferred to the present framework.9
6 Conclusion
In the profession, there seems to be a deeply ingrained belief that political equilibria with
parties that maximize their vote share would always have to be convergent. But given the
Theorems of this paper, it should be clear that oﬃce motivation can be reconciled with
divergent platforms in equilibrium. The crucial argument for convergence is that moving
closer to the other party’s platform can never hurt. But this argument only makes sense in
the context of convex preferences on the part of voters. Once we drop the assumption of
convexity, there is no reason to believe that any party should always want to move closer
to the other parties’ platform. The dimensionality of the issue space comes into play since
single-peaked preferences over a uni-dimensional issue space are automatically convex.
Observe that the same argument holds true for certain parties: it is not always better
for a party to move closer to the other party’s platform when voter preferences exhibit non-
convexities. It might well be that some party’s best response is to diverge from the other
party’s platform, even when both parties have perfect information about the electorate.
Consider, for example, the case of a game (2,[−2,2],{ψ2}) with ψ2 as deﬁned in the proof of
Theorem 1. Fix the platform of party two at (.1,.1). It is a best reply for party one to oﬀer
platform (1,1). Voters with ideal points at (0,1),(1,0) and (1,1) all prefer (1,1) to (.1,.1),










9 to party one. There is no platform x in that
game such that πψ1(hx,(.1,.1)i) > 7
9 would hold. Moreover, the platforms (.1,.1) and (1,1)
diverge (even according to the strictest notion of divergence proposed here). However, the
proﬁle h(1,1),(.1,.1)i does not constitute an equilibrium in (2,[−2,2],{ψ2}), as party two
would be better oﬀ to match party one’s platform.
9Of course, there are some more diﬀerences between the setup of the preceding paper and the present one:
in that paper, I study convex belief sets and non-atomic electorates. None of these turn out to be relevant
to obtaining the existence result.
20In short, the result that equilibrium platforms must be identical is actually the artiﬁ-
cial result of the assumption that issue spaces are uni-dimensional and that parties act as
expected vote-share-maximizers. Without those two - quite possibly counterfactual - assump-
tions, it is easy to give examples of models in which parties announce divergent platforms in
equilibrium. The centerpiece of this paper is such an example.
This is just a paper on the existence of divergent equilibria in games of electoral compe-
tition a la Downs-Hotelling. It sets the stage for a set of interesting and diﬃcult questions
on the characterization of the equilibrium sets in such games: what are suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of divergent equilibria? How can the connection between party uncertainty
and equilibrium divergence be quantiﬁed? Can we relate the “extent” of the non-convexities
in voter preferences to the divergence of equilibrium platforms? How do the equilibrium
platforms relate to the distributions of ideal points that are implied by the sets of priors on
voter preferences Ψ?
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228 Appendix
Here I show that the game deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 1 does not have any equilibria out-
side h(0,0),(1,1)iand h(1,1),(0,0)i. To see this, assume that hx,yi / ∈ {h(0,0),(1,1)i,h(1,1),(0,0)i}
was an equilibrium of the game. The proof proceeds by showing that for any y and any best
reply x∗ to y, it holds that πψi(hx∗,yi) > 1
2 for i = 1,2. Applying this observation to the
conjectured equilibrium proﬁle, we obtain that πψi(hx,yi) > 1
2 holds for i = 1,2. But this
implies that party two would be able to increase its vote share according to ψ1 and ψ2 by
changing its platform from y to x. To show that πψi(hx∗,yi) >
1
2 indeed holds for i = 1,2
for any best reply x∗, I separately consider the case in which y ∈ (0,1)2 and the remainder
(for which y1(1 − y1)y2(1 − y2) = 0 holds).
First consider the case in which y ∈ (0,1)2 and y1 + y2 ≤ 1 hold. Deﬁne ￿ > 0 such
that (y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿) ∈ [0,1]2. Observe that voters with ideal points (0,1) and (1,0) prefer
(y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿) to y. To see this, compare the utility that a voter with ideal point (0,1)
derives from the platforms y and (y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿) and observe that
u
(0,1)(y) < u





1 − y2 < −
√
y1 − ￿ −
p
1 − (y2 − ￿) ⇔
y1 + 1 − y2 + 2
p
y1(1 − y2) > y1 − ￿ + 1 − y2 + ￿ + 2
p
(y1 − ￿)(1 − y2 + ￿) ⇔
￿(￿ + 1 − y2 − y1) > 0,
where the last line holds for any permissible ￿. By symmetry, any voter an with ideal
point (1,0) also prefers (y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿) to y. Single-peakedness of preferences implies that
voters who have their ideal point at (0,0) prefer (y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿) to y and that voters with
ideal points (.5,.5) and (1,1) have the inverse preference. In sum, we have ψi({%: a(%) ∈
{(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)}}) = πψi(h(y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿),yi). For the two beliefs, the expression takes
the values πψ1(h(y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿),yi) = 22
27 > 1
2 and πψ2(h(y1 − ￿,y2 − ￿),yi) = 16
27 > 1
2.
Since the agents with ideal points (0,1) and (1,0) have preferences that are symmetric
around the line of proﬁles z with z1+z2 = 1, these agents are indiﬀerent between (y1−￿,y2−￿)
and (1 − y2 + ￿,1 − y1 + ￿). Since ￿ was chosen such that yi − ￿ ≥ 0 for both i = 1,2 the
platform (1 − y2 + ￿,1 − y1 + ￿) is in the issue space [0,1]2. The voters with ideal point at
(1,1) prefer (1−y2+￿,1−y1+￿) to y by single-peakedness. By the symmetry of the setup,
the vote share to party one in proﬁle h(1−y2 +￿,1−y1 +￿),yi is 16
27 and 22
27 according to ψ1
and ψ2 respectively.
Now, observe that if another platform x attracted any other set of voters S at least
one of the three following conditions holds for both i = 1,2: either ψi({%∈ S}) >
1
2, or
ψi({%∈ S}) < πψi(h(y1−￿,y2−￿),yi), or ψi({%∈ S}) < πψi(h(1−y2+￿,1−y1+￿),yi). Now,
23if the one of the latter two conditions holds x cannot be a best reply, as either (y1−￿,y2−￿)
or (1 − y2 + ￿,1 − y1 + ￿) would be strictly better replies than x. In sum, it holds that
πψi(hx∗,yi) >
1
2 holds for both i = 1,2 at all best responses x∗ to some platform y ∈ (0,1)2
with y1 + y2 ≤ 1. By symmetry, the same holds for the case in which y1 + y2 ≥ 1 and
y ∈ (0,1)2. Applying the introductory argument we can conclude that there is no equilibrium
hx,yi with y ∈ (0,1)2.
So next, consider a strategy proﬁle hx,yi with y1 = 0. And let us assume that y2 6= 0.
First, consider the case in which y ￿ x holds true for voters with ideal point (0,1). In this
case, party one gains the support of all voters when playing a best reply x∗ against y. To
see this, consider the platform (￿,y2 −￿) for some small ￿ and observe that voters with ideal
points at (0,0) and (1,1) and (.5,.5) prefer the platform (￿,y2 − ￿) to y as
v
(α,α)(y) < v
(α,α)((￿,y2 − ￿)) ⇔
−α
2 − (α − y2)
2 < −(α − ￿)
2 − (α − y2 + ￿)
2 ⇔
−α
2 − (α − y2)
2 < −α
2 + 2￿α − ￿
2 − (α − y2)
2 − 2￿(α − y2) − ￿
2 ⇔
0 < 2￿α − ￿
2 − 2￿(α − y2) − ￿
2 ⇔
0 < 2(￿y2 − ￿
2).
In addition, observe that by single-peakedness a voter with ideal point (1,0) prefers (￿,y2−￿)
to y. Only voters with ideal point (0,1) prefer y to (￿,y2 − ￿). Since ψi({%: a(%) ∈
{(0,0),(1,0),(1,1),(.5,.5)}}) = πψi(h(￿,y2 − ￿),yi) > 1
2 for i = 1,2 the platform proﬁle
h(￿,y2 − ￿),yi cannot be an equilibrium by the arguments presented in the introduction of
the proof. So it cannot be that y gains the support of (0,1).
So let us consider the alternative case in which x gains the support of (0,1). It cannot be
that x ∈ (0,1)2, since we already ruled out above that either party oﬀers platform in (0,1)2
in equilibrium. For x / ∈ (0,1)2 to gain the support of the voters with ideal point (0,1) it
must hold that either x = (0,x2) with x2 > y2 or x = (x1,0) with x1 < 1−y2. If only voters
with ideal point (0,1) vote for party one according to the proﬁle hx,yi, party one would be
better oﬀ to oﬀer y. If not, then party two can deviate in a way to reduce the partisans of
party one to the set of all voters with ideal point (0,1) (where the deviations are constructed
like the deviation against (0,y2) above). By symmetry, the same logic applies to all other
cases with yi ∈ {0,1} for i = 1 or i = 2 and y / ∈ {(0,0),(1,1)} .
There remain two last candidates for equilibria h(0,0),(0,0)i and h(1,1),(1,1)i. Of
course, all voters are indiﬀerent for these platform proﬁles and therefore each party ob-
tains a vote share of 1
2 according to either belief for either one of these platform proﬁles.
To see that a deviating party can do better than that consider the proﬁle h(0,0),(0,0)i
and a deviation to (0,.5) by party one. Voters with ideal points (0,1),(.5,.5) and (1,1)
24all prefer (0,.5) to (0,0), the remaining voters have the inverse preference - all by single-














2. Therefore, (0,.5) is a better
reply for party one and h(0,0),(0,0)i cannot be an equilibrium. By symmetry, the proﬁle
h(1,1),(1,1)i cannot be one either. ￿
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